Topic:
THE STATUS OF KOSOVO
Authors:
Vojislav Kostunica
Before we tackle the issue of the future legal status of Kosovo, we
have to say something about the current, actual status of Kosovo, that
is, about the actual condition of human rights in the province. Over
the past ten years or so the international community, that is, the
U.S., used to view the problem of Kosovo solely through the optics of
its human rights record. Though the issue of human rights, that is,
their violation, appeared in various forms in the former Yugoslavia as
well, both in respect to individual and collective rights, U.S.
officials saw this as a problem only in Kosovo, and exclusively
affecting the Albanians.
The last U.S. ambassador to Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann even claimed
in the spring of 1992 that "since the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
the Kosovo problem is the gravest human rights problem in Europe."
After the latest wide-scale Albanian rebellion in Kosovo, in 1998, the
official Washington began to speak about a "higher phase" in violation
of the Kosovo Albanians' human rights, which allegedly manifested itself
as a humanitarian catastrophe and genocide. After a Serbian delegation
refused to accept the ultimatum in the form of the Rambouillet
agreement, this served to "justify" the bombing of Serbia and the
arrival of the international missions -- UNMIK and KFOR -- in Kosovo.
Reports of various international organizations at the end of last and
the beginning of this year (the U.N., the OSCE, Human Rights Watch),
however, showed that even the worst examples of earlier violations of
humans rights, which, as a rule occur in any autocratic state, were
negligible compared to the conditions that emerged after the bombing
of Serbia and the arrival of the international civilian and security
missions in Kosovo.
The U.N. special envoy for human rights in the former Yugoslavia, Jiri
Dienstbier, formally best qualified to describe the condition of human
rights in Kosovo, has concluded that UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo "have
failed in achieving a single one of their declared objectives," and
that the situation in the province has only turned for the worse. He
also said that despite the presence of the interim administration in
Kosovo, the officially but not essentially demilitarized KLA and
organized crime are actually in power there, and that what was going
on was not a result of revenge, but of an organized policy of ethnic
cleansing of Serbs and all other non-Albanians, masterminded and
carried out by Albanian extremists.
All this leads to the conclusion that NATO's intervention from the air
and the arrival of foreign troops in Kosovo were not, as U.S.
President Clinton put it, a just and a necessary war, but rather a
war completely unjustified and unwarranted. In order to cover this,
the U.S. government and the U.N. behave as if the reality in Kosovo is
not tragic at all, but is, in fact, idyllic, and are gearing up for a
census and elections, doing all in their power, as opposed to what was
earlier done for Albanian refugees, to prevent the return of Serb
refugees, and to make, in various ways, living conditions for the
remaining Serbs so unbearable so that they too would leave. All this
confirms that the Americans and NATO did not arrive in Kosovo because
of human rights, but because they are convinced that the power they
wield entitles them to maintain a civilian and military presence in
Kosovo, a strategically important part of the southern Balkans.
If we continue to follow this logic, it is clear that their presence
would be safer if no Serbs were left in the province. After all,
Madeleine Albright now says that the idea of a multi-ethnic Kosovo is
unattainable. Maybe from that standpoint an independent Kosovo would
be the best solution, which, by the way, is a concept supported by all
Kosovo Albanian representatives alike, from "moderate" Ibrahim Rugova to
not-at-all-moderate Hashim Thaci, the description of both being quite
irrelevant and part of the same political game. It is not by accident
that a number of U.S. officials, including U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.
Richard Holbrooke, agree with this.
The trouble, however, lies in the fact that the idea of an independent
Kosovo is just another name for a Greater Albania, a project that
could greatly augment the current instability in the Balkans, which
suits Washington perfectly and which it uses to secure its presence
and interests in other parts of the world.
What does U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 have to say about the
future status of Kosovo in the light of these facts? The resolution is
a good example of U.S. legal Newspeak, which enables various sides to
see in an international document that which suits them the most,
whereas the final word comes from envoys of the supreme arbiter based
in Washington, regardless of whether his name is Carlos Westendorp,
Wolfgang Petritsch, or Bernard Kouchner.
Resolution 1244 and its two annexes thus speak of "essential self-rule
in Kosovo" and of "respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the FRY," but in line with the Rambouillet agreement. As it is
well known, the final part of the Rambouillet Agreement contains the
following provision: "Three years after this agreement goes into
effect, an international conference shall be convened to establish a
mechanism for the final resolution of the status of Kosovo, based on
the will of the people, position of relevant authorities, efforts
invested by all sides in regard to implementing this agreement, and
the Final Helsinki Act, and it shall provide an overall assessment of
this agreement's implementation and look into proposals of all sides
in regard to undertaking additional measures."
This is the arbitration model that was used in the case of Brcko, but
this time it involves not a small, three-member commission, but an
international conference at which the U.S. and its European allies
will have the final say.
As far as the "Rambouillet Agreement" is concerned, it should be kept
in mind that Serbia has not accepted it, and that, therefore, it
cannot be considered an agreement or a pact at all. In addition, this
so-called agreement is in direct violation of Articles 51 and 52 of
the Vienna Convention on Contractual Law of 1980, which say that all
agreements made under pressure are legally void, which goes for the
Rambouillet agreement as well, because Serbia was asked to accept it
under the threat of bombing. This is confirmed by the following
"diplomatic" message from U.S. State Secretary Madeleine Albright: "If
the negotiations fail because the Serbs say no, then we will bomb
them, but if the Albanians refuse to agree with it, we will no longer
be able to assist them and will cut all aid they have been receiving
from outside."
It is clear that resolution of the future status of Kosovo for all
those who care about law at all must be sought within those provisions
of Resolution 1244 which call for respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the FRY and substantial self-rule in Kosovo.
In other words, a resolution should be sought within Serbia and the
FRY. This is most important; everything else comes only after that.
It is beyond doubt that the architects of the Rambouillet agreement
and the culprits of the illegal and criminal bombing of Serbia can at
will resort to other solutions. In this sense, the issue of the
future status of Kosovo cannot be viewed as an exclusively Serb or
Albanian question. Rather, it is a question of how much legality still
remains in international law. This is a question of choosing between
the traditional, legalistic, and lawful understanding of law, and a
new concept of law understood in terms of force, that is being
nurtured in Washington, Brussels, London and elsewhere in Europe.
Because of this, this question is to a lesser degree related to the
future status of Kosovo and much more to the future status of law.
(The author is president of the Democratic Party of Serbia)
Hashim Thaci
After the war Kosovo is at a crossroads. It would be a mistake to slow
down the process of its transformation, but to accelerate it against
the political will of its citizens could also endanger the fragile
stability in the region. Therefore the solution most acceptable to
Albanian interests, that of the international community, and the Serbs
and other national minorities is a temporary political status of
Kosovo which could serve as a means to achieve the goals Kosovo's
citizens ultimately aspire to.
A transitional solution for Kosovo's political status should not be
expected to resolve all the problems that were created before the war,
but should be seen as a necessity for a political compromise of all
three sides involved that should contribute to building mutual trust
between the Kosovo citizens. At the same time, Kosovo's transitional
political status could serve to start building true local legislative,
executive and judicial institutions, the lack of which had provided
for the emergence of elements of anarchy and violence.
The institutional vacuum has led Kosovo and the international
community into an unenviable position, because it is not known where
the responsibility of Kosovo's citizens ends and where that of the
international community begins. Because of that it is necessary to
create political preconditions for establishing a legal and an
executive system, on the basis of which the post-war Kosovo would
achieve its initial form.
This stance of mine should advise the opposition in Serbia that it
should start altering its positions on Kosovo if it desires to
distance itself from the anti-Albanian policies of Milosevic.
Otherwise, not only the Serbs in Kosovo, but the Serbian opposition as
well, will become a hostage of a failed concept. The temporary status
would indicate that Serbia was removed from Kosovo because of its
genocidal regime, while the Serbian opposition, if it shows a true
respect for the right of the citizens of Kosovo to opt for
independence, has great chances of becoming a democratic force that
has a future.
The temporary defining of a political status would provide for the
creation of basic mechanisms for the development of Kosovo and its
safety. This solution, on the one hand, would offer the possibility to
prepare and implement a law on census and on holding free multi-party
elections, and, on the other, create formal conditions for security
and stability in Kosovo, without which no serious investment can be
expected, nor any democratization in political relations, particularly
among different nationalities...
Of course, the temporary status is not in line with the will of
the citizens, who overwhelmingly favor Kosovo's independence, but it
is the best alternative to not having any status whatsoever. This is
because U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 leaves room for various
interpretations, which depend on the side involved and the interest
threatened. Thus, we currently have micro-zones closed to each other
and to other parts of Kosovo, which is contrary to the interest of
those who should implement U.N. Resolution 1244 -- the Serbs who live
in those micro-zones, but the Albanians as well, who demand freedom of
movement in line with the resolution, as well as with their political
and national interests.
(The author is president of the Party of Democratic Progress and
co-president of the Interim Administrative Council of Kosovo.)
