The future of Kosovo is no longer as uncertain as it appeared a year ago. The NATO intervention, the withdrawal of Serb military and police forces, and the arrival of the U.N. mission have changed the former unnatural conditions in which a minority ruled over a majority. The question of Kosovo's status, owing to the compromising character of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which continues to consider Kosovo an integral part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in a certain sense has been left open. But, it is no longer blocked, as it used to be, when the Serb military power was in a conflict with the practically plebiscite will of the Kosovo Albanians to secede from Serbia and Yugoslavia. Serbia/Yugoslavia can no longer condition processes in Kosovo, though they still have a certain obstructive influence.

At this point the main problem of Kosovo is the compromising nature of Resolution 1244. This document failed to provide a satisfactory framework, even if temporary, for the resolution of the Kosovo question. On its part, the UNMIK, as a mission established hastily and without a clearly defined plan, also failed to create a stable and efficient administration. The U.N. Security Council, in fact, has no clear stand on a unified mission in Kosovo, where the U.N. should play the role of protector. To a certain degree, protectorate surpasses the capacity of the organization, and could even change its character, which is a notion disliked by all, or at least one over which there is no agreement. This might well prove the chief reason for the withdrawal of the U.N. mission from Kosovo. But this does not mean that foreign troops would leave Kosovo or that the protectorate mission would not continue. It will be assumed by some other organization, which will have greater possibilities to succeed in it.

Anyhow, the problem of Resolution 1244 should be resolved by June, when the extension of the UNMIK mandate will be reviewed. As of recently, intense diplomatic and concrete activities have been launched to find a new, better defined formula for Kosovo, so as to make up for all the shortcomings of the existing resolution, and enhance the process of stabilizing Kosovo and the region. It remains to be seen how successful these activities will be. In any case, there are several possible options. The first is for the great powers to fail in reaching an agreement, which would then automatically extend the validity of Resolution 1244, and extend the UNMIK mandate by another six months or a year, with or without the addition of new instructions for interpreting the relevant provisions of the resolution. That would mean that in Kosovo the Kouchner formula of joint temporary administration and painstakingly building democratic institutions will continue, with open options. In other words, only a reconstruction and overhaul of the provisional system would be carried out in Kosovo, instead of major construction work.

The other possibility is withdrawal of the U.N. from Kosovo. This could happen if Russia and China veto extending the UNMIK mandate in the Security Council. In such an event, much like in Macedonia wherefrom the U.N. mission was withdrawn as a result of a veto by China, there would be no power vacuum in Kosovo that could create the possibility of a new war. NATO would take over, because it already plays a dominant role and accounts for the bulk of KFOR. As far as security forces are concerned, NATO has already made an important, and probably a far-reaching decision to cede command over KFOR to Eurocorps, as the core of the EU Army.

Though KFOR would remain under the supreme command of NATO, Europeans would be in charge of command on the ground. EU member countries which for years have been seeking to form joint defensive forces, not only for rapid interventions but joint military effectives as well, would finally obtain an opportunity to demonstrate in Kosovo, and the wider Balkan region as well, their capabilities and a joint defensive strategy that would no longer depend on NATO in which the U.S. not only plays a major role but also has military preponderance. This formula of transferring security responsibility to the EU could be a prelude to a similar maneuver on the political plane. Instead of UNMIK and a U.N. secretary general special envoy -- if the extension of the mission is vetoed -- an EU mission with an EU special envoy could be established, to continue UNMIK's task.

Such a development would not be a precedent in the true sense of the word. The EU used to have such a mission in Mostar, despite its not so glorious outcome. The Kosovo mission would certainly be more complex than the one in Mostar, but would also have to be more efficient and better organized than UNMIK. The EU bureaucracy is no less developed than the U.N. bureaucracy, but since Europeans already have the greatest responsibility in UNMIK, it might be easier for them to deal with a purely protectorate mission, than with an indirect one, executed through such a complicated organization as the U.N.

If the future formula for a more lasting way out of the Kosovo crisis declares Kosovo a European question and, therefore, a matter in the EU's responsibility, with Russia and neutral China having excluded themselves from the game, then the role played by the U.S. emerges as crucial. Will the Americans also withdraw or will they seek a compromise through the formula EU + U.S.? In all stages of resolving the Kosovo question prior to the intervention, the Americans were the driving force that pushed the matter forward and even accelerated it. Would they now consent to being sidelined, and would the EU be able at all to deal with the problem of Kosovo and the region without the U.S.? It appears that a solution will be found in cooperation, wherein the U.S. would retain the same military and political influence as long as Europe does not become capable of single-handedly taking care of the security of Kosovo and region and political processes therein. This will pose no greater problem because the U.S. has been an active European power in the past as well.

The question of the attitude of the great powers toward Kosovo and other open problems in the region is a question of their interests and visions, but the great powers cannot resolve all the problems alone, without the cooperativeness of local political forces. The great powers, in fact, do not have fully prepared solutions, nor could they, even if they had them, impose them as long as among local subjects there are strong obstructive factors. In the case of Kosovo this goes for both the Serbs and the Albanians. Albanians want to separate themselves from Serbia and this stance is quite firm, and cannot be changed or amended easily. They might accept a compromise; for instance, a temporary postponement of this issue, in the event the process of its resolution leaves enough room for fulfillment of their aspirations within the foreseeable, and not infinite, future.

The Serbs, on the other hand, have almost fully lost hope that Kosovo can remain part of Serbia. Their expectations, therefore, as well as their obstructive efforts, follow two paths: the majority wants as soon as possible to establish an ethnic demarcation line between the Serbs and the Albanians, and to join the northern part of Kosovo to Serbia proper. The other option, that has a minority support, is the one promoted by Bishop Artemije and his collaborators and which requires that the question of the final status of Kosovo be frozen until violence in Kosovo and Serbia ends. Artemije, who has minority backing in Kosovo and Serbia alike, and who has contacts and coordination with the opposition in Serbia, wants to postpone rapid solutions, unfavorable for the Serbs, that would irretrievably exclude Milosevic's Serbia from all combinations in making decisions regarding the future of Kosovo. Both Artemije and the Serbian opposition hope that Serbia will be in a much better position after the fall of the Milosevic regime, and because of that insist that a final decision on the status of Kosovo be frozen.

It is assumed that without Milosevic Belgrade would have much more favorable maneuvering space, whereas meanwhile, foreigners could "cool off" and become alienated from Albanians, because of their impatience to attain their goal as soon as possible and their inability to place under control extremists who do not choose means nor follow well-meaning advice from foreign factors, requiring them to end their campaign of vengeance and violence against Serbs and other ethnic minorities. The compromising formula currently offered by the U.S. diplomacy represents a kind of umbrella for both extreme stances. According to it, Kosovo should have -- in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 -- as clearly defined transitional status as possible, with elected, democratic institutions. This should be achieved as soon as possible so that in two years at the latest Kosovo would have a parliament, government, president, and other entity institutions, that would have state authority, but without independence. The final status, therefore, would be frozen until some future time, as required by the Serbian side. This is, in essence, a formula very similar to Tito's, when Kosovo was granted broad autonomy and the status of an equal member of the former Yugoslav federation, and was a republic in all but in name. Kosovo, therefore, should be a strong entity, almost a state, but not recognized as such. In the transitional period, the position of Kosovo, in fact, would be rather similar to that of Republika Srpska, which is part of the Bosnian Union, but would be in a slightly better position because it would not be dependent on the bodies of the Union, tied to the FRY only by a thin, quite theoretical link, if the FRY succeeds in remaining a federation at all.

Certain European partners have some reserves in regard to such U.S. plans. Despite its being pragmatic and feasible, they fear the speed of the process, that is, that the Albanians would take advantage of their strong status to unilaterally declare independence. Therefore a modality for additional guarantees is being sought to prevent such an outcome, at least until conditions for a final solutions mature, pertaining not only to Kosovo, but to the region as a whole. From all this it can be inferred that as far as a mid-term solution is concerned, the future of Kosovo is rather close to being defined, whereas options for its final status are still open. What is certain, though, is that possibilities for its remaining a part of Serbia are rather slim, or practically, nil. All roads lead toward its full independence from Serbia. Whether this means that Kosovo will be fully independent, or will become part of some regional solution, at this point it is still a question with an uncertain answer.

(The author is a philosopher and publicist, and works as a columnist for the daily newspaper Zeri.)

March, 2.000.