The plan for cantonizing Kosovo and Metohija emerged in September 1998, as one of the possible ways to solve the crisis, which was entering the stage of open military confrontation, by compromise. As opposed to the concept of ethnic exclusivity that led to ethnic cleansing, the cantonization plan was envisaged as a solution that would to a great extent preserve the essential interests of the two fiercely confronted ethnic communities, the Serbs and Albanians. In that context, the plan to cantonize Kosovo and Metohija offered a framework wherein Serbia would preserve its sovereignty, the southern Serbian province would also maintain its wholeness, and the germs of future divisions would be avoided, because they always led to new conflicts and estrangement.

The cantonization model itself -- which originally should have been implemented by Serbia and thus interrupt a series of disastrous political decisions concerning Kosovo -- rested on quite successful results achieved elsewhere. The manner in which the Swiss Yura Canton was separated from the Bern Canton served to me, the project's author, as an initial inspiration. The Swiss model was aimed at preserving the cultural traditions of two communities divided by their linguistic heritage: the Francophone Yura required separation from the Bern Canton where the German language was dominant. In addition, there also were religious differences: the former was largely Roman Catholic, whereas the latter was Protestant. A similar phenomenon existed in Kosovo and Metohija: the ethnic Albanians differ from the Serbs in their language, religion, and culture, much like these Swiss cantons, which managed to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner giving every city, town, village, and even hamlet their own respective choice.

The other source of this cantonization model proposed for Kosovo and Metohija was a part of the Vance-Owen Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning cantons, as a framework that would produce favorable results in the Balkans and lead to a global solution, applicable in all of Southeastern Europe where the interests of various ethnic groups clash. Though in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina this model, due to the desires of the Bosnian Croats to practically turn cantonal borders into ethnic borders, appears rather unpopular, it is still more acceptable than other similar solutions.

The third source for this plan was the model of multi-ethnic cities, which would serve as bridges to bring closer two cantons which are temporarily, but not entirely, separated along ethnic lines. While the cantons would be created only in rural areas, where the social background of the conflict -- the dispute concerning arable land -- had strong incentive in ethnic hatred and religious differences, multi-ethnic cities were envisaged as oases of co-existence that, over the next few generations, would offer a model of joint life for the rural cantons. There is no need particularly to stress that the cantonization model fits well into the general principles of the OSCE concerning the protection of national minorities, as a European framework within which cantonization would be introduced.

The fourth, extremely important factor in this plan were the pre-conditions set by the Kosovo-Metohija Serbs, on the eve of a wider conflict and having in view numerous negative experiences in the past, as a minimum for their survival in the southern Serbian province in the event of further escalation and expecting a negative outcome.

Namely, the Albanian political elite sovereignly ruled Kosovo and Metohija from 1968 to 1989 without any interference from other parts of Serbia, but the 1980s were marked by a dual jurisdiction -- that of the federal state and of the local Albanian authorities. In the 1968-1981 period of undisturbed Albanian dominance, due to open or hidden ethnic discrimination a significant number of Serbs left the province, which led to a dramatic raising of this issue during the 1980s. Only in the second part of this decade did it become a means of manipulation that served Slobodan Milosevic's ascent to power, whose disastrous rule has additionally deepened the already existing ethnic divisions, fanning extremism on both sides.

Namely, Milosevic tolerated the creation of a parallel Albanian administration in order to use legislative seats obtained through the votes of Serbs and minority groups and the Albanian boycott of the polls to rule all of Serbia, while completely ignoring the escalation of the ethnic conflict. Foreboding treason similar to that which had already affected the Serbs in Krajina, Baranja and a large part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo-Metohija Serbs attempted to define the minimal political and legal competences that would ensure their survival in the province: local Serb self-rule, that is, police, judiciary and administration (executed by Serbs and in Serbian), in those rural areas where they constituted a prominent majority. The estates of Serb monasteries before the 1941-1944 occupation during World War II and the confiscations by the Titoist communist regime would be also added to Serb cantons.

Such demands did not only take into consideration the horrifying experience of ethnic discrimination carried out in the name of "brotherhood and unity", but also the practical experience after the terrorist activities of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army began. At the same time, the ever frequent threats of the pending destruction of churches and monasteries (which, for the time being, has only partly been prevented by KFOR, that is, by its military guards around the bigger and more important churches and monasteries) indicated that cantonization would be an important factor in preserving Serb cultural monuments as the most important element of their culture within a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural community.

Though before the eruption of the war in Kosovo and Metohija both the ruling regime in Serbia (the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party) and the Albanian separatists found it easy to agree to directly reject the cantonization plan, they did so for different reasons. While representatives of the regime saw that the plan meant they would have to renounce their charge over a part of the province's territory (in areas where Albanian cantons were to be formed) and where power would have to be shared with ethnic Albanians, for Albanian separatists the model was unacceptable because it envisaged the right of the Serbs to participate in the administration of Kosovo in a way that would preclude ethnic discrimination. The Albanians attempted to additionally discredit the cantonization plan by equating it to proposals calling for the division of Kosovo and Metohija even though the plan called for an undivided territory consisting of Serb cantons distributed among larger Albanian enclaves.

When the cantonization model was accepted in principle by representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metohija, and by supporters of opposition parties and movements in Serbia, the ruling regime did all it could to prevent and marginalize the participation of Serb Orthodox Church and Kosovo Serb representatives in the negotiations on the fate of Kosovo in Rambouillet and later in Paris.

After the horrifying war and mutual ethnic cleansing, and in conditions of growing conflict, cantonization manifested itself to the Kosovo Serbs as the only solution that could prevent them from being ethnically cleansed. Although one of the five proposed cantons in Metohija has been ethnically cleansed already, a spontaneous cantonization in larger Serb enclaves occurred, where -- under new circumstances and under the auspices of the U.N. -- a joint U.N. and local Serb administration should now be established. However, in its revised version as well, adjusted to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, the cantonization plan has been rejected both by the UNMIK and Albanian representatives, without any other credible and acceptable solution being offered in turn to the Serbs to ensure their lasting personal and collective security. All this took place despite the fact that the cantonization plan also offers a possibility to preserve the deeply endangered multi-ethnic character of Kosovo, where persecution of Serbs and Roma continues unabated, and is a first step in establishing a publicly declared goal - a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Kosovo, whatever its future status may be...

Today, the Serbs are those who insist on cantonization, because cantonization, or some other similar form of organization under some other name, is a matter of life and death for them, a matter of their survival in or disappearance from a territory they have inhabited for over one millennium. Shrugging one's shoulders in response to the persecution and plight of the Serbs, and sporadic condemnations of such violence, are a poor cover for gloating and exulting over the mass exodus of the Kosovo Serbs from the province which has become a U.N. protectorate. Therefore, the cantonization of Kosovo and Metohija is not a plan its author (who is the author of this article as well) insists on; it is what the Serbs in Kosovo themselves ask for, because for them this would mean salvation from persecution, abductions, exile, rape, and murder, all of which they are being exposed to throughout Kosovo, except in the spontaneously established cantonized enclaves.

Belgrade, September, 1999

(The author is the advisor of the Serb Ortodox Church conserning the question of Kosovo and Metohija)