KOSOVO/A ON-LINE

Topic:
The Status of Kosovo
Authors:

Adem Demachi

Professor Milica Pejanovic Djurisic, Ph.D.

Adem Demachi

All that Mr. Milosevic has done so far in the field of politics is inopposition to the common sense, but is in compliance with his aim tokeep power for himself and his political class, for which many alreadyknown arguments exist.

All Mr. Milosevic's political acts are in the function of enslavingpeople and inflicting injustice, and, as such, are in opposition tothe law on incessant moving towards freedom.

The internationalization of the Kosovo issue would easen, to a degree,communications between international factors and the Belgrade regime.Thus, Belgrade would be granted a wider maneuvering space as themediator would surely be from the OSCE and the European Council.Recent experience shows that the Belgrade regime is capable of takingadvantage of the differences existing between members of the EuropeanUnion in order to achieve its hegemonistic aims.

The Serbian leaders are well aware that when it comes to Kosovo, dueto the region's precarious position, the relevant internationalfactors, especially the U.S., would not allow the repetition of Bosniaand Herzegovina. Therefore, the Belgrade regime would do everything inits power to make the Serbian people vote against internationalizationof the Kosovo issue.

The mediator is of crucial importance because internationalizationitself cannot solve the Kosovo issue. After the bitter experience ofBosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the massacres in the Drenica andMetohija regions, I am very much convinced that it is more thannecessary that the U.S. mediate and guarantee the negotiations betweenthe Albanians and Serbs. The assistance and support given to the U.S.by Europe is important, but the Americans should take responsibilityfor preparing and developing the negotiations, as well as guaranteeingthe implementation of possible decisions. Practice has proved thatonly the Americans have all the instruments needed to successfullybring such a difficult task to an end.

In March 1989, the Serbian terrorist regime in violation of theconstitution killed once and for all in the spirit of enslavedAlbanians the possibility of any kind of autonomy of Kosovo withinSerbia.

In January, February and March of 1998, the terrorist regime inBelgrade, with its massacres in the Drenica and Metohija regions,killed once and for all the possibility of Kosovo becoming a thirdrepublic within the Yugoslav Federation.

If the world is willing to stop the aims, plans and efforts of Messrs.Milosevic and Seselj to "serbicize" Kosovo before it is too late, thenthe only possible compromise remains the creation of a small Balkanconfederation -- Balkania.

For those who are interested, I will quote here only some aspects ofthis proposal. This is an effort to formulate an essence of suchorganization of life within a union of free and sovereign Balkanstates. This should also serve to implement the will of the Kosovopeople shown in the referendum held in September, 1991.

Instead of commenting on the project, I will cite some excerpts fromthe Balkania Project's basic objectives, which are as follows:

"To prevent further bloodshed between the Albanian people on one side,and the Serbs and Montenegrins on the other;

To avoid bloodshed worse than the one that took place in Bosnia andHerzegovina;

To maximally preserve the crucial interests of the Albanians, theSerbs and the Montenegrins;

To fulfill the persistent demands of the international factorsregarding a violent change of borders in the former Yugoslavia;

To create concrete and realistic conditions for just and permanentsolutions, in the territory of former Yugoslavia and the whole of theBalkans, I suggest the following:

The small Balkan confederation (henceforth referred to as Balkania)should not have a constitution. A charter would suffice, in the formof a solemn statement that would be compiled by three sides, in thespirit of surpassing the past and creating a new era in relationsbetween these free and sovereign Balkan states."

The first three articles of the Balkania Project are as follows:

1. Balkania is a union of three secular, free and sovereign states ofthe Balkan Peninsula: Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia.

2. The right to join and leave Balkania is unalienable, unlimited andindisputable.

3. Each Balkania member has its own representatives in internationalorganizations such as the U.N., etc.

The small Balkan confederation would deal a final blow to Serbianhegemony and pan-Slavic megalomania. Only then, the process ofdisintegration in the former Yugoslavia could be transformed into anunhindered integration process.

Only the Balkania Project can overcome disputes between some Balkansstates, which would never support a union of Kosovo with Albania, orthe creation of an independent state of Kosovo.

In this confederation, the Albanian people of Kosovo, having their ownstate and defense mechanisms, would have a safer future and at thesame time would preserve ties with their compatriots in Serbia,Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia.

Only in such a confederation, the Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosovowould not be degraded into minorities, and would remain nations equalto the Albanians.

Only the Balkania Project would prevent the undesirabledestabilization of Macedonia. As soon as the small Balkanconfederation is successful, Macedonia would join it. This would leadto the creation of a middle Balkan confederation. In it, the Albanianpeople in Macedonia would not be treated as a minority within theborders of Macedonia.

Soon, due to a variety of interests, Bosnia and Herzegovina would alsojoin the middle Balkan confederation.

Though from today's perspective it seems improbable, within a shortperiod, attracted by many interests of her own, Croatia would alsojoin the union, thus opening the way towards the creation of a bigBalkan confederation.

In this way the Balkans would become a safe region and once and forall would disappear from the agenda of the internationalorganizations, being replaced by Russia, China and India.

This is my proposal for the future regardless of the results of thereferendum of April 23, 1998, in Serbia.

In opposition to this civilized option, a barbaric and bloody one isbeing prepared by the political class and military-police complex ofSerbia headed by Messrs. Milosevic and Seselj.

I wonder whether America and Europe will hesitate to use all theircolossal capabilities and means in order to prevent hatred andhysteria against the enslaved Albanian nation and the civilized andfree world? I wonder whether they will prevent a new war in theBalkans with disastrous consequences prepared by Messrs. Milosevic andSeselj?

They are quite serious. They are deploying their police, army andheavy weaponry in all strategic locations in Kosovo in order toprevent the incessant movement towards freedom.

Let us not allow them!

(The author is president of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo)





Professor Milica Pejanovic Djurisic, Ph.D.

Throughout modern Europe, the problem of the status of ethnicminorities is resolved primarily by way of democratic principles,which is why Kosovo is a democratic issue, not a territorial problem.

Today, unfortunately, Kosovo is considered a territorial problem bothby the Serbian authorities and legitimate representatives of theAlbanian nation in Kosovo. It is not sufficient simply to state thatthe problem has escalated and is being resolved in an anachronisticfashion that cannot resolve it; we must do everything that we can todemocratize this region and thus create the only political atmospherethat can facilitate the resolution of the Kosovo problem.

If the government of Serbia and legitimate representatives of theAlbanian nation in Kosovo each stick to their own political views, itis logical to expect that the violence will to continue to increase,that innocent people will suffer, poverty will mount, Serbia will fora considerable time be excommunicated from European civilization,whereby the common person will bear the consequences, regardless ofethnic origin.

In addition, the Kosovo problem cannot be resolved with the principleof historical right, championed by the official Serbia, nor theprinciple of ethnic right, supported by the Kosovo Albanians. It iscertain that, in a conflict between these two views, the people wouldlose the most.

It is quite certain that today, there is not a single Serb who wouldagree to Kosovo not being part of Serbia, just like no Albanian fromKosovo can see himself as part of Serbia in the future. On the otherhand, every attempt to settle any concrete problem is considered oneside's loss, and the other's gain. Allowing ethnic Albanian studentsto make normal use of educational facilities, which is completelynormal and necessary, the Albanian side believes to mean that its viewis prevailing, while the Serb side considers it a defeat.

This is only one example of how a rational problem, which has aethical, humane, and human dimension, has been brought to an absurd.At the same time, it is both a sign and warning that there are nosimple and ready-made solutions for Kosovo, and that mutual confidencebetween the Serbs and Albanians can only be achieved slowly, step bystep, and with well-meaning mediation from the internationalcommunity. This is a path that avoids labeling one side the winner,the other the loser, and leads to victory for both sides. Thealternative is defeat for all sides, that is to say, war, in which allsides shall lose.

The above clearly indicates that the first and basic precondition forresolving the status of Kosovo is the democratization of Serbia andinclusion of Yugoslavia in all international organizations, especiallyEuropean integration processes.

Yugoslav access to European integration processes would automaticallyrelativize the importance of borders and territorial sovereignty tothe degree prevalent in the European Union, which is why the possibleintroduction of sanctions against Yugoslavia or Serbia would in factbe counterproductive, as it would lead us farther away from thegreatly needed European integration. Sanctions would only serve toconsolidate the retrograde factions in Yugoslav politics andstrengthen the autocracy typical of Slobodan Milosevic's rule. Itwould also give rise to extremist political demands from the Albanianpoliticians in Kosovo and considerably cut chances for compromise andpossibilities for a satisfactory settlement.

It is not difficult to see that introducing sanctions against Serbiaor Yugoslavia and open war in Kosovo are in fact one and the same.Xenophobia and opposition to the West, which are an unfortunate aspectof Serbian reality, would only gain in intensity, while rumors ofinternational conspiracies against Serbia, which are constantly beingcirculated by the neocommunist parties, would additionally fuel theflame. The xenophobia, fear, hate, distrust etc. that would reign inSerbia in the event of sanctions, could have consequences that willecho throughout Europe.

The international community must not abandon Serbia, even thoughSlobodan Milosevic would like this, which is why is has called areferendum on international mediation in the settlement of the Kosovoproblem. The referendum is nothing but deception, which Milosevic istrying to use to bring about the national homogenization of the Serbnation, consolidate his rule, and impede democratic processes andreforms in Montenegro.

Even though the outcome of the referendum is quite clear, theinternational community must continue cooperation with Serbia,encourage and give practical aide to potential for reform inYugoslavia and in such a way blunt the blade of the xenophobic andwarmongering forces in Serbia.

The first step in that direction would be support to the democraticand reform-oriented course of Montenegro. I is not difficult toconclude that the fate of Kosovo, that is, the method used to resolvethat complex and neglected problem, depends to a very large degree onthe development of democratic processes in Montenegro.

If Slobodan Milosevic succeeds in preventing democratic reforms inMontenegro, which he is attempting to do through his exponent MomirBulatovic, and Bulatovic's political movement, the possibility of warin Kosovo should not be excluded. If, on the other hand, thedemocratic forces gathered around the Democratic Party of Socialistsare victorious in the May legislative elections, the democraticprocesses can be expected to gain in strength at the Yugoslav level aswell, thus leading to efforts to resolve the problem of Kosovodemocratically and with the active participation of the internationalcommunity.

(The author is president of the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro)