Topic:
HOW TO RESOLVE THE KOSOVO PROBLEM
Authors:
Mahmut Bakali
To my mind, some of the basic premises in the case of Kosovo,
comprising a framework for loosening the Kosovo knot, from which we
should proceed in discussing the Kosovo issue, might be as follows:
1.The Albanian people in Kosovo can on no grounds be treated as a
"national minority" both because of its numbers (the Albanians make 90
percent of the present-day Kosovo population, while in former
multi-national Yugoslav federation they were the third largest people,
exceeding in numbers many other peoples that have their own
independent states today. The Albanian people is the second largest in
the present-day Yugoslavia, closely behind the Serbs.) and due to a
fact that the Kosovo Albanian population represents almost one half of
the total Albanian population. Thanks to unjust wars and unfair
international decisions made during the establishment of the Albanian
state, the Albanian people remained divided into halves for the entire
century. The same people, living on its own ethnic soil, remained on
two sides of an international border.
2.The right to self-determination is to be recognized to the Albanian
people in Kosovo. The implementation of this sublime principle of
democracy in the 20th century is inevitable in resolving the Kosovo
conflict. Regardless of ongoing attempts at suppressing the right to
self-determination, I am convinced that its fulfillment in the Kosovo
case is unavoidable. Here I think of exercising this right in a
contemporary sense, which implies that its radicalism should not harm
other peoples and that it should be in compliance with other
principles set by the international law. A manner in which Kosovo came
under Serbia's rule, systematic repressions by the Serbian
authorities, expressed aspirations towards independence and many other
criteria prove that the right to self-determination belongs to the
Albanian people.
3.It is also necessary to recognize historic, freedom-loving
aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians, their plebiscites and commitment
to the independent republic of Kosovo out of Serbian state's
jurisdiction. The Kosovo Albanians elected their own legitimate organs
and ascertained the independent and democratic position of Kosovo
after the breakdown of former Yugoslavia, which is their legal right,
since Kosovo was an integral part of former Yugoslav federation. In a
word, this cannot be called an arbitrary vote, and the Albanian
people's will and determination cannot be denied.
4.It is also necessary to recognize the interests of Serbian and other
peoples in Kosovo in terms of full equality with the Albanian majority
people in the province. Also, the general interests of the Serbian
people and the Serbian state in preserving historic and religious
monuments in Kosovo, as well as other spiritual values of the Serbian
people in Kosovo, should be fully respected. Thereby, Kosovo would be
an independent republic, and not solely Albanian, but rather the
republic of all peoples constituting it and a democratic state for all
its citizens. This is also to deny militaristic ideas of a solely
Serbian or solely Albanian Kosovo.
5.The international principle of integrity of existing international
borders cannot be maintained by force and unilaterally. New relations
and tendencies in the world require new ideas and new actions, freed
from certain taboos, accepted as stereotypes. Maintenance of Kosovo
under Serbia's rule became meaningless and worthless, whatever the
form of autonomy might be, even than provided for by the 1974
Constitution. For a context within such an autonomy was built has
vanished. After all, even under the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo executed
the state powers independently of Serbia, because it used to be a
constitutive element of the then federation, just like other
republics.
6.If it stems from the Dayton Peace Agreement that territorial
integrity of the present-day Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) must be recognized, then it must be recognized, but
without fettering natural democratic aspirations of the unjustly
divided Albanian people. It has to be given an opportunity to achieve
its national unification without changing borders, but within a future
Europe with open borders and within European integration processes.
However, after the signing of the Dayton accords, not only Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but also the entire territory of former Yugoslavia and
the entire Balkans can no longer be the same. Therefore, the Dayton
spirit has to embrace the soil of present-day Yugoslavia, which
implies radical changes in its political and constitutional systems.
All independent states on this soil, including the republic of Kosovo
as well, are yet to agree and decide upon common integration, which
would be an integral part of the European integration processes. A
possibility of anyone's hegemony should be excluded.
I underline the integration as a part of regional European integration
processes, because the former federations had compromise themselves
with the fall of communism. Furthermore, the integration I am talking
about can in no way resemble the former Yugoslavia or what we call the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia today. It should have a form that would
suit all members. It could be a union, or an alliance of independent
states or a confederation that would have open and liberalized borders
with neighbors, and which would be involved in all European and world
mechanisms and organizations. The chosen form of integration would be
also be liberated from all kinds of sanctions, and it would be
included in collective bodies of European security and defense,
depending on their interests and choice.
It is also necessary to urgently change the situation in Kosovo, stop
repression against the Albanian people and alter the position of the
province, because the current situation means continuation of the
Serbian authorities' brutal repression against the Albanian people
that cannot be alleviated by mere activities related to the protection
of human rights. The current status quo is becoming a generator of
fresh conflicts by itself, and a possible source of a large-scale
conflict in the Balkans with unforeseeable consequences. The local
authorities' repression against the Kosovo Albanians and increasingly
frequent terrorist actions in the province, contrary to a peaceful
policy the Albanian political movement sticks to and all public
condemnations and distancing from such actions by the Albanian
political parties, prove that resolving of the Kosovo status can no
longer be delayed. All these events are a mere reaction to both
Serbia's repression and the Serbian and Albanian leadership's
passivity in taking practical steps towards resolving the Kosovo
issue. I would also describe them as reactions to the lack of
efficiency by the international community in resolving the position of
Kosovo and the Albanian people.
In order to curb large-scale conflicts, it is necessary to carry out a
broader preventive diplomatic and political activity, not only to
settle but also to overcome this unsustainable condition. First and
foremost, it is necessary to start a decision-making process and
urgent negotiations between legitimate representatives of the Serbian
and Albanian parties, focused on peaceful and political resolving of
the Kosovo status. The talks should be carried out with international
mediation. Another possibility is to convene a special international
conference concentrated on the status of Kosovo and the Albanian
people, or a conference dealing with regional integration processes in
South-East Europe, which would include a solution for the status of
Kosovo and the Albanians. Of course, the Kosovo status has to be
resolved in a just manner and in accordance with the
liberation-oriented aspirations and declarations of the Albanian
people. For, I am afraid that any solution ignoring the Albanians'
aspirations would inevitably lead to reinvigorated conflicts and
perhaps a war. I believe that our dialogue here, our approximation of
opinions and our proposals may contribute to the just and peaceful
resolution for the Kosovo status.
(The author is a political scientist from Pristina, and also a former Kosovo official)
Zoran Djindjic
Let me start with two remarks.
The question we should be asking ourselves it not how to solve the
Kosovo problem, but how to go about resolving it. It is not a
linguistic matter only. We have a chance to start moving forward only
if we are realistic. And as a final resolution to the problem of
Kosovo does not appear realistic, all participants in the process of
its resolution should be psychologically prepared for a strategy of
small steps.
The other remark concerns the framework of the Kosovo problem's
resolving. In my view, this framework should be the legal and
political system of modern Europe.
In modern Europe's legal and political system all major problems are
dealt with through establishing and guaranteeing rights. Such an
approach excludes violence, intolerance, endangering human rights,
and similar non-legal mechanisms.
How, then, should we go about resolving the problem of Kosovo by way
of law instead of violence?
The first consequence of what is, in my view, the only right decision
-- dealing with the problem of Kosovo within the framework of the
legal and political system of modern Europe -- is that the Kosovo
Albanians have no right to an independent state. There are no legal
grounds for founding such a state. The right to self-determination,
quoted by ethnic Albanian politicians and intellectuals in support of
their demands, from a legal point of view, does not imply independence
or secession. The right to self-determination is a basic democratic
right to freely shape one's own life within an existing state.
The right to create a state does not stem from the democratic right to
self-determination, but many other rights are indeed its consequence.
They include human, personal, political, collective, and other rights.
And -- what is even more important -- all these rights require
institutions to guarantee that these can and will indeed be
implemented. Without an independent judiciary, unbiased media and free
elections, of what use would a person's human, civic or political
right be?
If, for an instant, we reduce the problem of Kosovo to a dispute
between the Serbian authorities and the ethnic Albanians, we have but
to criticize both sides. The Serbian authorities have failed to secure
institutions that convincingly guarantee basic human rights. Not only
in Kosovo, but in the entire country, there is no independent
judiciary, objective public informing or free elections. The
Albanians, on the other hand, should be criticized for inferring their
right to secession from the fact that, in Serbia, there are
insufficient guarantees for exercising democratic rights. Such a
conclusion is in opposition to the modern European legal system.
Namely, the fact that a state lacks institutionalized guarantees for
citizens rights, results in the right to create political, union and
other organizations aimed at democratizing such a country. This is the
only proper course when our country is in question as well. Of course,
this holds true only if the intent of the parties involved is to deal
with problems in the manner of modern Europe, instead of in the ways
of the Stone Age.
The problem of the Albanians in Serbia, beyond doubt, is not only the
problem of personal rights, but of collective rights as well, even of
political status. We have inherited this issue from the times of
Tito's Yugoslavia (the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, headed by its late communist president, Josip Broz Tito),
in the form of the autonomy problem. Whatever the contents of this
autonomy, it is clear that it involves a set of specific rights.
Autonomy can be achieved only within a lawful state. Tito's Yugoslavia
was not a lawful state and, in it, autonomy was only a means of
political manipulation.
One of the aspects of such manipulation lies in the fact that the
issue of territorial autonomy was confused with the issue of
collective ethnic rights. The territorial autonomy of Kosovo and
Vojvodina is one matter, while specific rights for national minorities
and ethnic groups is something entirely different. That knot, so
skillfully entangled by Tito, we have now to disentangle with much
patience and with the assistance of the proper legal instruments.
We may choose between two paths. One is short and radical. It is the
path of force, pressure, attempts to rearrange the facts (create a new
state), for which subsequent international approval would be
requested, and also the path of suspending all rights by violence,
under the excuse that they endanger the survival of the state. This is
a path traveled by political extremists. I do not know what is at its
end, but I am certain that it does not lead into modern Europe.
The other path is long and winding. It involves a painful process of
establishing and guaranteeing rights. Its stages are clear.
Institutional guarantees of basic rights must be created. These are
the guarantees without which no democratic solution is stable.
Whatever form of autonomy is agreed on for Kosovo during the political
process, would be but words on paper without democratic institutions
to support the functioning of that autonomy on a daily basis.
My message and my conclusion is the following: the problem of Kosovo
cannot be dealt with in the ways of modern Europe without an enhanced
democratization of Serbia. If we wish to deal with it as a legal
problem, and not as an issue necessitating force, we need legal
institutions that deserve and enjoy our respect. It is an enormous
task for the future, both for the Serbs and the Albanians living in
Serbia.
A reader may well view this conclusion as being excessively
theoretical and lacking practical answers. He or she may well add that
the time of thinking is behind us and that now the time has come to
act. I agree that a lot of time has passed and that very few issues
have been properly addressed or solved. But this does not mean that
speedy solutions would resolve anything. I believe that it is better
to try to put out a fire with buckets of water, however small, than
with a tank full of gasoline. Speed and radicalism solve nothing. It
is much better to make a small step in the right direction than ten
huge paces leading the other way.
(The author is president of the Democratic Party)
