Topic:
KOSOVO - INTERIOR OR INTERNATIONAL ISSUE
Authors:
Sonja Biserko
For a decade now, all the relevant international institutions and
leading countries, primarily the U.S and the EU, have been dealing
with the Kosovo issue. Numerous reports on violence and torture in
Kosovo have flooded all the relevant offices. The majority of foreign
representatives, who visited the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over
past years, did not pass up a chance to also visit Kosovo, and once
again express their concern. However, to-date nothing has gone beyond
the expressing of concern and fabrication of reports at various
levels, which were supposed to be a special pressure on the regime in
Serbia. While the war in Bosnia lasted, the Albanians were recommended
patience and a continuation of peaceful resistance. The Albanians,
with their stagnant policy that did not create problems, were "in" and
that is why they received support and compassion from the West.
The change of the status quo in Kosovo that occurred over the recent
months, had Significantly changed the dynamics of the events and raise
the level of "concern" in the world. The appearance of the so-called
liberation army, is more than a possible direction for the development
of the situation in Kosovo, than represents a realistic military force
at this time. However, from the psychological and moral point of view,
this, for now, informal group, could expand into a serious movement
and revolution, such as those in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. The
inertness of Rugova's policy no longer reflects the reality in Kosovo,
which creates dissatisfaction within the to then homogeneous Albanian
corpus. The special radicalization is under way, but with a certain
restraint because of the justified fear that the situation could
easily slip out of control. The independent Kosovo at this time has no
alternative. There are still no voices on the horizon, which could
articulate even the reserve Albanian option.
On the Serb side the situation is so to say dramatic. Even beside the
certain Friendliness of the international community toward Serbia,
primarily because of the feeling of a possible break up of this
society, president Milosevic is neither prepared nor capable of
accepting offers which come from the outside. The measures which the
regime has been launching recently, such as those on the ban of
foreign currency real estate transactions, to the one on conditioning
the issuance of passports with the fulfillment obligations to the
state, such as taxes, speak more about a panic then a contemplated
economic policy.
It is not a matter of "bringing order" on the market, which the
majority of citizens would welcome, because in essence they would
relax, but literally about the buying of every minute for the survival
of the regime. In such agony, it is difficult to even imagine that
Milosevic has any room for creative policy, especially regarding
Kosovo. Kosovo has been and still remains a source of Serbian
irrationality. The frustration because of the defeat in Croatia and
Bosnia could easily be used for a new homogenization and mobilization
of Serbian nationalism. Opposition, although on the margins,
reiterates the exceeded empty phrases on "a democratization of Serbia
and the implementation of European standards in Kosovo."
Kosovo is a political issue and only as such could it be resolved.
Everything else is escapement. That issue can not be resolved without
recognizing the already realized status of Kosovo in former
Yugoslavia, because on the contrary it will remain an unresolved
issue. It will drag Serbia into an abyss and permanently cripple it
for any form of transition or democratization. The inability for
viewing reality in both the world and abroad, a true definition of
national and state interest, puts Serbia in a position of a total
loser. It could also be said that a certain consciousness exists about
it. However that produces an effect contrary to the anticipated.
The Serbian, political and intellectual elite does not want Albanians
in their state. They fought the war for a Great Serbia hoping that
with the acquisition of territories in Croatia and Bosnia they could
yet divide Kosovo. It has not yet given up on that goal. They had
abandoned the territory in Croatia, but not in Bosnia as well. The
Republika Srpska is still treated as a war prize. A differentiation,
reached in RS through Biljana Plavsic still has not reached the point
of no return. The choice of Milorad Dodik is very clever because his
co-operativeness creates an illusion that an essential overturn has
occurred in RS. If the international community continues to be
yielding, the Serbs have yet a chance to realize it.
The international community as an active factor of our crisis, does
not continue to show decisiveness nor does it notice the connection
between the Kosovo issue and the nevertheless uncertain future of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Insisting on dialogue between the two sides is
only an expression of their lack of readiness to complete the task to
the end. However, their presence in the region is unavoidable, but it
always arrives late. Only with the creating of a new reality do they
come with solutions that are additionally difficult and slow. That
procrastination has to date cost Bosnia the most. What would the
creating of a new reality in Kosovo mean? Mass ethnic cleansing and
new tragedies.
Dialogue is not possible between two unequal sides with opposing goals
and projects and aspirations for the same territory. In Serbia there
are not internal forces prepared to reach through dialogue a
compromise solution agreeable for both sides. The Political
immaturity, provincialism and an essential misunderstanding of world
events, disqualifies them from such dialogue.
The Albanians and Serbs need the mediation of a third party, which
would define the framework and give principles for a solution. Only
within a given framework is it possible to exert pressure on both
sides in the direction of the implementation of such a project.
Unfortunately, the international community has missed its chance to
find a global solution for former Yugoslavia, with equal principles
for all. In other words it missed a chance to impose the solution from
the Hague conference in 1991, on all the Balkan actors. Now it is
doing so partially with much greater efforts and at a much higher
cost.
A conference such as the one in Dayton, as soon as possible, is the
only way out for both the Serbs and Albanians. Both sides have
promised much and now it is difficult to find a way to give up on it.
For that a volunteer culprit is needed. The arguments against the
conference that there was no war in Kosovo, are not convincing. The
economic crash and chaos, such as the one in Albania in 1997, which
Serbia is slipping on is more than a good reason for a conference.
The recent tragic events in the Drenica area clearly demonstrate the
inability of the Serb side to resolve the Kosovo knot through dialogue
and respect of the Albanian rights. To the West, the skilled
"acrobatics" of the Serbian regime are becoming growingly transparent.
Judging by the speed with which the meeting of the Contact Group was
scheduled, it appears that, this time around, the West is determined
not to commit the same mistakes which characterized its approach at
the time when the Yugoslav crisis was only starting.
(The author is the chairman of the Helsinki Committee for human rights
in Serbia)
Baton Hadjiu
Finally -- at least as far as the international public is concerned --
the Kosovo Question has received due attention. However, the official
positions of the international centers still do not correspond fully
to the nature of the problem. The international decision-making
centers have not yet defined Kosovo as an international problem though
there is a high degree of agreement in regard to the matter. Opposed
to such a definition are chiefly those countries which have problems
similar to Serbia's, and the countries created on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. However, the question of Kosovo differs
considerably from other ostensibly similar cases.
First of all, the issue of Kosovo is made international by both the
Serbian regime and the Serbian opposition, which had agreed that the
question of Serbs outside Serbia -- in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia -- should be resolved under the direct influence of the
international factor, though the Serbian regime is excluded from
almost all international mechanisms and associations. On the other
hand, those states in which the Serbs live -- Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia -- unlike Yugoslavia, have gladly accepted the involvement of
the international factor, albeit being internationally recognized and
accepted.
Therefore, the Albanians are right in believing that it is not proper
or reasonable that the status of the Serbs outside Serbia, that is,
outside Yugoslavia, is being resolved with the mediation of the
international community, while international mediation is deemed
unnecessary when the status of Albanians should be resolved. Such a
policy of double standards only strengthens the need for the
Serb-Albanian dialog to be held in the presence of the international
factor, which should participate in the talks and act as a guarantor
that the results of the negotiations will be implemented.
Secondly, the degree of violations of individual and collective rights
and freedoms in Kosovo has reached such dangerous proportions that an
open conflict may well result. The conflict could spill over state
borders and inflame a large area, thickly populated with Albanians,
which is simultaneously a part of four states. Objectively speaking,
turning a blind eye to this grave situation would ultimately discredit
all international institutions which protect human rights and
freedoms, and all those countries which represent themselves as true
synonyms of democracy and humanity. The international factor cannot
remain silent when defenseless people -- children, women, and the
elderly -- are being killed only because they are Albanians. Long ago,
the Serbian national-chauvinism entered the stage of state-sponsored
terrorism, which is a catastrophe and the greatest danger in today's
Europe.
Thirdly, the Albanians hold that Kosovo is an international problem
because they have lost all confidence in Serbia, that is, Yugoslavia,
because these two states were created and function contrary to the
political will of the Albanians and without their participation, and
also contrary to their own constitutions and laws. The Albanians do
not trust the state that cancelled Kosovo's autonomy and trampled on
their rights, moreso because Serbia and FRY claim themselves to be
democratic, while they are operating as police states, they declare
themselves as states treating their citizens as equal, while they, in
fact, sow discrimination and hatred.
Finally, only political masochists in Serbia can consider the issue of
Kosovo an internal question, because every objective person can but be
certain that Serbia is incapable of resolving it. Both in terms of the
present situation and in historical terms, the Kosovo question far
exceeds the limits and capabilities of the Serbian state. However, if
the Serbs continue to regard the problem of Kosovo as their internal
question, they will run the risk of allowing Mr. Milosevic not only to
fail to unite them in a single state, but to expose all of them,
including Republika Srpska, to a serious danger.
With the Albanian tragedy at a culminating point, the Serbian regime
and Mr. Milosevic at its forefront, instead of starting to redefine
its policy towards the Albanians, is resorting to obsolete methods and
judgements. Their incorrigible policy is reflected in a synchronized,
loud propaganda claiming that they are "making a distinction between
the separatists, and the enormous majority of Albanians." In the past,
while the world was still prone to fall for such declarations, this
could pass for truth. But today, while this propaganda still echoes
over Kosovo, the Albanians, who have patiently waited for some five to
six years, with their mass and dignified demonstrations openly confirm
that the true disposition of the population is entirely different.
On the other hand, similar propagandistic attempts by the Serb's
traditional friends, such as the Russians, appear misplaced, because
all the Albanians have unanimously opted against a policy which
jeopardizes their freedom and rights, while the democratic world did
the same in regard to violence, which had resulted in a radicalized
situation in the province. Furthermore, in addition to its persistent
call for dialog, and "making of a distinction between separatists, and
a huge majority of other Albanians," with much efforts the regime had
managed to produce a handful of "honest" Albanians, to negotiate on
behalf of "the huge majority of Albanians," which is a practice often
resorted to in the past. But, though the source of "honest" Albanians
has been exhausted, the regime is still convinced that the method may
continue to work, though the Albanians can no longer live in a state
which keeps endangering their identity.
Therefore, for their own benefit, and for the benefit of the Serbs,
the Albanians have decided to separate themselves from Serbia and free
themselves from its jurisdiction, but to remain within the borders of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Though such a move was long
overdue, the massacre in Drenica made it even more pressing. The
unequal but resolute struggle of the Drenica population in defending
their homes, the honor of their families and their national and human
dignity is seen not only as expression of a limited, local resistance
but, increasingly, as inseparable part of the Albanian collective
national awareness. On the other hand, the mass and ever more frequent
demonstrations of members of all strata of the population, all age
groups, genders, and religious denominations, organized in support of
that struggle, testify to the readiness and resoluteness of the
Albanians to achieve their political goals.
If "a huge majority of Albanians" indeed differs from the Albanian
"separatist" parties, then this difference lies in the fact that these
Albanians are no longer capable of trusting meaningless statements,
and, therefore, demand concrete actions in implementing their declared
political will. This certainly should not be seen as their acceptance
of the hegemony of the Serbian state in the future. It is increasingly
clear that only the separation of Kosovo from Serbia can save both the
Albanians and the Serbs from a great danger. In a ten-year period
during which Serbia kept considering Kosovo "its own internal
problem," the situation in the province not only remained unresolved,
but came to the verge of war. In considering Kosovo its internal
problem, the Serbian regime has proven itself violent and strong, but
also incapable and unprepared to resolve problems that it created
itself. This is why the question of Kosovo is an international
problem.
(The author is editor-in-chief of Koha Ditore)
