Topic:
WAR OR PEACE IN KOSOVO
Authors:
Behlul Beqaj
To any reasonable person there should be no dilemma over the question
of whether the Kosovo issue should be resolved peacefully or through
war. Reasonable men would opt for peace. However, the fact is that for
almost eleven years of Milosevic's rule and peaceful resistance of the
Albanians rallied around Rugova's policy for almost that long, no
visible results were produced, whereby any reasonable judgement was
discredited. It was, in fact, to the contrary. The intense and
systematic repression by Milosevic's regime and the lack of any
concrete results of the peaceful policy pursued by the Albanians, have
forced the larger portion of the advocates of a peaceful policy for
the resolution of the Kosovo question to retreat before the growing
appeal and strength of the liberation resistance embodied in the
Kosovo Liberation Army.
The peaceful policy the Albanians have pursued so far is experiencing
absolute defeat. Not even the only document signed so far -- the
Agreement on the Normalization of Education (signed in September,
1995) -- has been implemented, not to mention the political status of
Kosovo. On the other hand, the regime which had wanted to pacify
Kosovo, has long ago exceeded the critical point with intense and
horrible repression that lasted many years. However, there are plenty
of indicators which show that the regime, although nominally intent on
maintaining the illusion of peace, is prepared to go to war on behalf
of the Kosovo Serbs.
On the other hand, until the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army,
the Albanians lived under the illusion that they would be able to
achieve political self-determination solely with the force of their
arguments. Despite systematic violence, the regime failed to pacify
Kosovo, while the Albanians, despite undisputed political, legal,
historical, ethnic, economic and demographic arguments, failed to
achieve the independence of the Kosovo Republic. A years-long status
quo policy has resulted in an increasingly tense situation in Kosovo
and a poor level of security in the region. It is a fact that as far
as Kosovo is concerned, nothing essential has been changed.
Unfortunately, the persistent policy of the Serbian regime and -- from
the point of view of the existing internal and international
conditions -- the unproductive policy of the Albanian political
factors, have brought Kosovo into a situation without any alternative.
Secondly, the policy of peace has been jeopardized by the fact that
the regime, and especially the Serbian opposition, and, from time to
time, even certain international factors, have failed to convince the
Albanian side that Albanian participation in multi-party elections
would truly contribute to the democratization of Serbia. The Albanian
side was asked to help the opposition come to power, though the
opposition acted as an accomplice in the anti-Albanian policy. The
Albanians rejected this scenario knowing that they were not invited to
participate in the elections as an equal and independent partner, but
as a means that was to assist in changing the regime.
In other words, they were not called to participate in the elections
because their right to self-determination is recognized or because the
con(federalization) of Yugoslav territory is desired, but because they
were to serve as a voting machine that should help change political
relations in Serbia. In this, the Albanians are well aware of what all
others have failed to perceive -- controlling Kosovo is more important
that the democratization of Serbia both to the regime and the
opposition. Therefore, the Albanians intend to hold their own
multi-party elections on March 22, which put them before yet another
serious dilemma -- to continue with the policy of peace, or to take a
new, riskier path. Judging by the actual psychological atmosphere, the
latter will probably prevail.
According to a number of clear indicators on security conditions and
the human rights and freedoms situation in the region, it is obvious
that political space for the resolution of the Kosovo issue is being
alarmingly reduced, to reach its culminating point in the coming
months. The newest developments in Drenica and its surroundings only
confirm the seriousness and the dramatic nature of the situation,
whose roots lie in the past. Today, Kosovo is the only region in
Europe wherein human rights and freedoms are systematically
jeopardized. Thus, for instance, a report published in 1993 in the
United States, said that the number of political trials and political
prisoners per capita in Kosovo was the highest in Europe. In addition,
according to a local report, between 1981 and 1990, 3,340 Albanians
were prosecuted and convicted because of political activity. The
average sentence was seven years and two months. Using basic math we
can conclude that the prison sentences total 23,400 years in prison.
Furthermore, some 10,000 Albanians were charged with political
misdemeanors. Thus, they earned an additional 1,000 years in prison
which brings us to the final picture: Albanians, mainly young people,
were sentenced to altogether 25,000 years, or to 250 centuries in
prison! Just how far the line has been exceeded is also shown by the
official data provided by the Council for the Protection of Human
Rights and Freedoms in Kosovo. Namely, since 1981, 223 Albanians have
been killed, while only during the last three years 22,070 have been
beaten and abused. All this contributed to changing methods of
Albanian resistance, described by a resolution of the Council of
Europe, adopted at the end of January, as a result of Serbian state
repression against the Albanian ethnic community in Kosovo!
The greatest turning point in the consciousness of Albanians resulted
from appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The Liberation Army is
not important only because it took responsibility for almost all
actions carried in the region over the past two years, but because it
earned the respect of the wide strata of the population. It was very
conspicuous during the funeral of teacher Halit Gecaj in the village of
Lausa, near Srbica, where some 20,000 Albanians gave a standing
ovation to three members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Also, a recent
poll taken among the students of the University of Pristina shows that
the students see the Kosovo Liberation Army as the organization most
trusted to achieve the political goals of the Albanians. Thus, the
political configuration of Kosovo assumes a different sense and
dynamics.
Today, it is not rare to meet serious political factors in Kosovo who
claim that no agreement on the political status of Kosovo could be
reached without even tacit approval from the Kosovo Liberation Army,
meaning that the role and significance of the Army would depend on the
degree of compatibility between the political status of Kosovo and the
political will of the Kosovo Albanians. If that status did not conform
to the Albanian wishes, the possibility for the Army to become the
main force in achieving the independence of the Kosovo Republic is not
excluded. Thus a new, and not very pleasant page in Serb-Albanian
relations would be turned.
A way out of the present, pre-war situation may be found only if
legitimate representatives of both sides, in the presence of powerful
international factors, operationalize the education agreement and
immediately start negotiations on resolving Kosovo's status, using
the German-French initiative as a basis for the talks. Kosovo is an
international question par excellance, this being confirmed by the
year-long inability of the Serbian regime to resolve the situation in
the region. To the contrary: the fact that the situation in Kosovo has
been brought to the point of explosion, is what gives the issue an
international dimension. And, finally, the Serbian authorities cannot
resolve the issue of the Serbs outside Serbia (in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina) without mediation by the international community, but
they still reserve the right to resolve the status of Albanians, that
is, Kosovo, without that same international community. With the direct
assistance and mediation of the international factor, and on the basis
of the German-French initiative, conditions would gradually be created
for enabling Kosovo to peacefully leave Serbia's jurisdiction.
The Albanians are well aware that the international community is
increasingly realizing that a solution for Kosovo should be sought
beyond the rule of Serbia over the province, but still within the
geographic and political territory of the rump Yugoslavia. Through the
creation of an adequate democratic and political infrastructure, equal
treatment would be secured for Kosovo in the future, in a community
different from the existing one, though neither side has shown any
readiness for compromise so far. Therefore, objections to the
German-French initiative should be expected, but let us hope that
neither side will see compromise as a defeat. The Albanians should
realize that their right makes only for a relative advantage, because
Serbia, being militarily stronger, still has the upper hand, and the
incumbent regime in Serbia should stop living under the illusion that
it will pacify Kosovo by repression. The latest dramatic events in
Drenica show that the Serb interest in Kosovo, as defined at this
point, is deeply wrong.
As a consequence of the "Drenica atmosphere," it may well be expected
that the current peaceful policy of the Albanians may give way to a
more up-to-date and significant liberation faction, though president
Rugova still has no adequate alternative. However, his prestige, until
recently entirely undisputed, is now seriously shaken. There are now
other Albanian leaders who are more dynamic and who know how to make
things happen. This is now even more probable, if the French-German
initiative is understood by the more radical faction as the start of
international community support for achieving the peaceful integration
of Kosovo into the Serbian state. This would not only postpone the
resolution of the issue, but could well turn Kosovo into an epicenter
of a new war in the Balkans.
(The author is a political scientist from Pristina)
(End)
Predrag Simic
On this day, in the already long gone 1990, the New York Times
published an article written by David Binder, in which he forecast the
break up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the next 18
months. Although in reality the war did occur next year, that did not
happen as anticipated, in the poor and ethically divided southern
Serbian province, but in one of the richest and nationally most
homogeneous republics of the former Yugoslavia. Contrary to
expectations, during the entire war in Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation in Kosovo and Metohija had remained
more or less stable, while a new deepening of tensions in
Serb-Albanian relations came about at the beginning of the
post-Dayton period, at a time when war in the western part of the
Balkans had already ended.
According to the first interpretation, commendations for it go to the
preventive mission of the international peace forces in Macedonia
which for the first time included American soldiers on the Yugoslav
territory. The reason for their deployment was the assumption that a
chain reaction of the Yugoslav clashes could be transferred from the
western republics to Kosovo, spread over to Macedonia, and drag into
the war all the neighboring states (including two NATO member
countries: Greece and Turkey) and cause the break up of the entire
southern flank of the North Atlantic alliance. According to the second
interpretation, such a assumption had never stood on solid ground,
Macedonia was the only Yugoslav republic to peacefully secede from the
former federation, while the entire southern part of the Balkans,
despite all the apparent similarities with the western part of the
Balkans, it still follows a significantly different logic of
inter-ethnic and interstate relations.
Be it as it may, the newest events in Kosovo over past two years give
say that the truth lies somewhere in-between. Namely, the "Kosovo
issue" is part of the so-called Albanian issue in the Balkans which,
apart from Kosovo, also encompasses western Macedonia, the eastern
part of Montenegro, northeastern Greece, Albania itself and an
increasingly strong Albanian Diaspora in Western Europe and the United
States. Like other Balkan nations the aim of the Albanian national
movements over the past several hundred years remains more or less
unchanged -- creating an Albanian national state in the Balkans --
within the boundaries which were determined back in 1898, by the first
Prizren league.
The unification of Germany and the break up of Eastern European
multinational states had brought about the emergence of a thesis among
Albanian political circles that "the Albanians are the last divided
population in Europe", that "only half the Albanians are living in
Albania while the other half are living in neighboring states" and
that "the failure of the Yugoslav experiment" points to a conclusion
that lasting peace in the Balkans would be possible only when the
process of creating national states on this territory is completed
(where the Albanians certainly are not alone). The Kosovo Albanians,
however, did not opt for an armed conflict, while one of the main
(although rarely publicized), messages of the Albanian parties in
Kosovo, said that the solution of this issue would be on the agenda in
the final round of the Yugoslav drama, in other words, that the
anticipated internationalization of the Kosovo issue would be favor
the demands their demands.
The conviction that "time is working in favor of the Albanians" was
especially encouraged by the victory of the Democratic party at the
elections in Albania in 1992: the coming into power of the first
post-communist government in Tirana, gained many sympathizers in the
West and Albania, with its membership in the OSCE, returned to the
European political scene. The Albanian political parties in Kosovo and
the Albanian Diaspora backed Sali Berisa, and in return, he supported
their demands: Albania was the only state to recognize the "Kosovo
Republic", in Tirana its "mission" was opened, the Albanian media had
given a lot of space to their countrymen in neighboring states, the
Kosovo Albanians had started to play an important role in the Albanian
economy and politics while the Albanian diplomacy was a valuable
channel by which their demands could be included in the agenda of
international organizations.
The policy of the Democratic Party, whose main pillars were in the
northern part of the country, did not meet with much understanding in
the south, where the opposition was dominant. Already at that time,
among the Albanian oppositionists it could be heard that Berisa was
heating up national emotions in order to cover up his inability to
resolve the domestic problems, and that the Kosovo issue, in fact
prevented Albania in its efforts to escape poverty and find its place
in the Balkan and European political scenes. When the first delegation
of Albanian oppositionists arrived in Belgrade in 1993, it showed
that Serb-Albanian relations were again developing on two different
tracks - national and state - which are uncomplimentary in many ways.
Even greater discontent among the Kosovo Albanians was caused by
the Dayton peace agreement, which had left Kosovo out on the
sidelines. Namely, when it became evident for the first time that the
problems of the southern Balkans would not be resolved analogous with
the western Balkans, and that the chances for an internationalization
of the Kosovo issue were increasingly weaker, in other words that the
policy of the Democratic party of Kosovo was not providing anticipated
results. Ethnic clashes in Europe after 1989 had also caused the
international community to approach the issue of national rights more
carefully.
Contrary to the earlier belief, according to which it means, primarily
the right to secession, national unification and creating national
states, today the predominant interpretations are that
self-determination can and most often must be "internal" (various
forms of autonomy, etc.), because on the contrary there is a threat of
an explosion of ethic clashes which could bring the entire
post-bipolar international system could find itself in chaos. When, at
the beginning of 1997 the regime of the Democratic party crumbled,
bringing down with it the entire state authority structure in Albania,
the Albanian national movement lost its important pillar, and the
Albanian national idea was seriously shaken.
For example, during the Serb-Albanian talks in New York, in the spring
of 1997, among the American participants a warning could be heard that
the break up of an Albanian state in the Balkans certainly did not
favor the demands for creating another. At that time, the messages of
the leading countries (primarily Contact group members) said that the
Kosovo issue must be resolved within Yugoslavia and that, after Bosnia
the "world is not hastening for a new Balkan crisis." The change of
government in Albania last fall had brought about a significant turn
of events in the relations between Tirana and Belgrade and Skopje,
which also did not favor the Albanian national movement in Kosovo and
Macedonia.
In short, after 1995, and especially after 1997, the Albanian national
movement in the Balkans had found itself at the crossroads: failure to
realize the proclaimed goals diminished the authority of the
Democratic party of Kosovo and its leader, voices of discontent
had started to arise even from influential Albanian politicians such
as Adem Demaqi, Bujar Bukosi and others, last fall a new generation of
young Albanians had entered the scene, the Albanian Diaspora had even
started considering alternatives, Ibrahim Rugova, but the essential
novelty on the already turbulent political scene in Kosovo was the
appearance of Liberation army of Kosovo which coincided with the
post-Dayton period in Bosnia.
Primarily the assassinations of Albanians who co-operate with the Serb
authorities are an attempt to prevent the Albanian national movement
from shedding. Second, the creation of a psychosis of fear and
insecurity intensifies pressure on the departure of the non-Albanian
population from Kosovo. Third, the use of the term "army", wearing
uniforms, carrying arms, and the organization of the Kosovo Liberation
Army could be interpreted as a demonstration of force directed at both
the Serbian authorities and the international community and a warning
that the Kosovo issue and demands of the Kosovo Albanians could not be
taken off the agenda.
Also, it should be stressed that the increased violence in Kosovo is
also applying strong pressure on the government of Fatos Nano in
Tirana, to abandon his contacts with Belgrade and Skopje and to take a
more active stand as regards the Albanian national (eg. Sali Berisa's
re-emergence on the Albanian political scene, which has corresponded
with the newest tensions in Kosovo).
In any case, the current wave of violence has succeeded in returning
the problem of Kosovo-Metohija on both the domestic and international
political scene,s although the possibility is slim that it could expand
into a larger conflict because of a moment of weakness of both, the
Serbian and Albanian sides. And while the Albanian parties are
demanding more intensely an internalization of the Kosovo issue (that
is spoken about in the renewed demands for establishing an
"international civil protectorate" or a "Kosovo Dayton", and others)
for the authorities in Serbia and Yugoslavia, today it is perhaps less
acceptable than ever before. In any case, it should be noticed that
that the newest development of events in Kosovo has resulted in the
representatives of the local Serbs emerging for the first time on the
international scene and presenting their demands in direct contacts
with the official bodies of both Western Europe and the U.S.
That also also leads to the unavoidable question, after everything
which direction would the Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo-Metohija
take? One possibility is further tensions which would unavoidably lead
to either wider repressive measures by the authorities, or to a
situation of anarchy which at one point could open the issue of the
implementation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("Action with respect
to threats to the peace, beaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression") in other words international action. In both cases the
consequences would be difficult to control and the fear from such an
event at this time was publicly voiced only by Macedonian President
Kiro Gligorov, with his controversial proposal on creating a corridor
in northeastern Macedonia for the evacuation of Albanian refugees in
the event of a conflict. Although these days it would be difficult to
find anyone in Europe and the U.S., who would be prepared to support
such a development of events. The recent experience on the territory
of Yugoslavia warns that Balkan crises could continue to essentially
affect the behavior of the international community. The second
possibility is that some form of Serb-Albanian dialogue is reached no
matter what its present extents would be- that is pointed to not only
by the most recent international initiatives (i.e. the proposals of
Robert Gelbard and Wolfgang Eishinger and the joint letter sent at the
end of last year by Hubert Vedrine and Claus Kinkel) but the
conclusions of the numerous Serb-Albanian contacts on the non
government level, over the past two to three years.
Judging by some newer European experiences in resolving ethnic clashes
(southern Austria, the Hungarian-Rumanian agreement, and similar),
such dialogue would have to have at least two dimensions -
international and interstate. In the first, it is possible that the
essential issues would have to be put aside and that emphasis could be
laid on measures for strengthening trust and security in the interest
of all the people in Kosovo such as the implementation of the
agreement on education and similar. In the second, it would have to
continue the process of Yugoslavia and Albania coming closer together,
which was started last fall, to contribute to the easing of tensions
in both countries and open a place for their more active role not only
in the region, but toward European integration as well. Namely, for
both countries, the "road to Europe", seems to pass through Kosovo.
(The author is an associate of the Institute for international policy
and economics)
(End)
