Topic:
NEGOTIOTIONS ON KOSOVO
Authors:
Bajram Kosumi
Without stopping this militant policy, which represents a danger not
only for Kosovo, but also for the entire region, there can be no
dialogue, negotiations, nor a peaceful solution to the Kosovo issue
1. The Triumph of the Serbian Militant Policy
It seems that Milosevic is a politician who makes successful moves
throughout the game, but loses in the end. This means that something
in his political philosophy is deeply wrong, contrary to the natural
flow of things. In vain have the Albanians for more than a decade
tried to impose a peaceful solution to the Kosovo issue. With his
militant policy, Milosevic has triumphed not only over the Albanian
peaceful policy, but also over the policy pursued by the international
community, which has invested much in trying to peacefully resolve the
issue. During all these years, Milosevic kept silent in regard to
Kosovo and laughed at the attempts by the Albanians and international
community to have the Kosovo issue solved in a peaceful manner. He
knew long ago that in the end he will pull out his trump card: his
militant policy. This Serbian militant concept was announced several
years ago by the Radical party leader Seselj when he stated that if
the Albanians wanted a state, they should take up arms and fight, and
if they did not want to fight, than they should accept to remain in
Serbia. Milosevic felt that the time to which Seselj was referring to
had come; therefore, he made a coalition government with him. The
truth is that Milosevic has no solution for the Kosovo issue. He has
only his militant policy. This policy, which led to wars in Croatia
and Bosnia, has started yet another conflict, in Kosovo.
2. Serbian Concept of Negotiations
Rugova's trip to Belgrade and the Albanian-Serbian talks in Pristina,
which were pompously announced as the start of negotiations for
solving the issue of Kosovo (for the Albanians) or the start of a
dialogue for solving the problems in Kosovo (for the Serbs), in fact,
were not the start of any kind of negotiations. These meetings were
the strongest evidence of the nature of the Serbian concept for
solving the Kosovo issue. What was the essence of the dialogue offered
by the Serbian regime?
First of all, it is a predetermined dialogue, based on the Serbian
constitution, which means that the future status of Kosovo should be
determined within Serbia. This is the first reason why this dialogue
is not a dialogue, but an order. In this way, the Belgrade regime
wants to impose slavery on Kosovo, rather than to negotiate. While
allegedly offering "talks without preconditions," the Belgrade regime,
in fact, imposes a number of preconditions, while not fulfilling a
single demand of the Contact Group and from U.N. Resolution No. 1164.
The second reason why this dialogue is nothing more than an order --
which is much more concrete than the first one -- is the Serbian
large-scale military and police offensive in Kosovo which started
simultaneously with the negotiations. It was even worse than that
because during the Albanian-Serbian talks, Serbian military actions,
in fact, were intensified.
These actions were in full contrast with the Serbian allegedly sincere
calls for dialogue. And if we abide by the saying that "actions speak
louder than words," we can be certain that the Belgrade regime is
determined to solve the issue with force, and that its calls for
dialogue are only deception. Maybe the so-called negotiations
according to the Serbian concept (Serbian order) were started only to
prove that they were impossible. But, the Albanians had to pay dearly
for this proof, both in human lives and property.
3. The End of the Serbian Militant Policy Opens the Way for a Dialogue
The core of the problem lies in the following question: are Milosevic,
and the Serbian policy in general, truly ready for dialog, for
negotiations with the Albanians, and for solving the Kosovo issue?
The answer to this question also give a response as to whether the
Kosovo issue will be resolved in a peaceful or a violent manner. Some
statements made by Russian and European diplomats, that the pressure
should be exerted on both sides in the conflict, are more than evil in
intent, because they demand that the Albanian side yield. Milosevic
has demonstrated his true militant nature. On the other hand, if there
were on the political scene in Serbia a moderate, realistic political
faction, there would also be hope that the Kosovo issue could be
solved peacefully, of course, if changes were made in the Serbian
political system first.
However, both the Serbian ruling party and the opposition -- with some
rare and negligible exceptions -- share the same, fascist stand toward
the Kosovo issue. The success and power of Milosevic and his policy
are primarily due to this policy's militant nature and to the
principles of national hatred toward the Kosovo Albanians. Therefore,
any deviations from these principles are considered by the Serbs as
defeat. Only in this light can the blindness of the Belgrade regime,
which is leading the Serb nation into war, be fully understood in the
wake of the tragic experience in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia,
leading to a war that will be even more tragic, and will be lost in
the end.
In this way, the Belgrade regime acts not only as a fierce enemy of
the Albanians, but also of its own, Serb nation, and its future.
Objectively, this regime is not fighting in Kosovo to protect some
fictitious interests of the Serb nation (the manner in which Milosevic
protects Serb national interests was well demonstrated in the Republic
of Serb Krajina and Bosnia), but to protect the interests of the
police-military-political machinery in Serbia, which has been the
essence of the Serbian policy throughout the history of the Serbian
state. Milosevic is the last advocate of this militant policy and its
most prominent representative today. Without stopping this militant
policy, which represents a danger, not only for Kosovo, but also for
the entire region, there can be no dialogue, negotiations, nor a
peaceful solution to the issue.
A NATO intervention in Kosovo should be understood in this context.
But, unless the Belgrade regime is convinced to abandon the policy of
issuing orders and starts serious negotiations with the Albanians as
equal partners, unless some of the international decision-making
centers are convinced that the Serbian concept for solving the Kosovo
issue is obsolete and can only bring a new bloodshed, unless all this
is understood and unless true Albanian-Serbian negotiations start, who
knows how many more lives will be lost and how many Albanian villages
will yet be destroyed. Only one thing is certain: Milosevic will lose
in the end!
(The author is vicepresident of the Parlamentary Party of Kosovo)
Vuk Drasskovich
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic said in Moscow that autonomy is
guaranteed to Kosovo, within Serbia and in accordance with the
existing democratic standards of Europe and the world.
It is good that something like this was said, but it does not seem
enough. Milosevic has an obligation to -- without delay -- announce
the state platform for the status of Kosovo and Metohija and to inform
of such a platform Ibrahim Rugova's negotiating team, the European
Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Contact Group, and the United Nations.
As president of the leading pro-European party in Serbia, I believe
that the state platform on Kosovo ought to offer Ibrahim Rugova's
negotiating team the following:
1. Kosovo and Metohija shall be granted a four-level autonomy within
Serbia, which is as follows:
a) a high degree of local self-rule in municipalities and towns;
b) an autonomous provincial legislature and government;
c) Albanian representatives in the Serbian Legislature and government
in proportion to the number of votes received in elections;
d) Albanian representatives in the Federal Parliament and government,
also in proportion to the number of votes received in democratic
federal elections.
2. All these levels of autonomy shall be in line with the existing
democratic standards of Europe, as defined by the OSCE and EU.
3. It will be necessary to establish bicameral local assemblies in
Kosovo and Metohija, as well as a bicameral provincial legislature.
One house will have representatives elected by a majority vote, while
the other house -- the House of the Peoples -- will include an equal
number of representatives of all peoples living in the province -- the
Albanians, the Serbs, the Muslims, and the Turks. All decisions
directly pertaining to the national, religious, cultural and language
rights of any of the nations, shall be reached by consensus in the
House of the Peoples.
4. Having in view that only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has
state and international legitimacy, guarantees for the whole body of
laws and obligations must be given by the federal state. Because of
that, the Serbian negotiating team must be composed of representatives
from both Serbia and FRY, while the rights which are in the competence
of the federal state, shall be exercised only within Serbia.
5. One principle shall be mandatory: local regulations must be in full
accord with provincial regulations, while provincial regulations must
be in full accord with regulations existing in Serbia, and these, on
their part, in full accord with regulations existing in FRY. Yugoslav
laws must also be in full accord with laws in European Union.
6. In line with this state platform, all foreign mediators and all
international services of good will shall be accepted in negotiations
between the Serbian Government and the FRY on the one side, and
Ibrahim Rugova's team, on the other.
7. The Contact Group and the European Union shall most strongly
condemn terrorism and all political demands for an independent Kosovo,
as well as demands for Kosovo becoming a third federal unit in the
FRY. The borders of Serbia are unchangeable. At the same time, the
Contact Group and the European Union shall most strongly and
decisively condemn projects for a Greater Albania in the Balkans, as a
most flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter.
6. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia
shall, in accordance with this Platform, unconditionally accept
foreign mediators, observers, diplomatic, humanitarian and media
representatives from Europe and the world.
9. All international economic and political sanctions against the
Republic of Serbia and FRY shall be lifted.
10. Mr. Ibrahim Rugova and his negotiating team shall be exposed to
adequate international sanctions should they fail to accept democratic
negotiations or to clearly and decisively condemn terrorism and all
demands for changing state borders in the Balkans.
I am convinced that in this way the dangerous crisis in Kosovo and
Metohija will be resolved swiftly and to the benefit of peace and the
democratic and state principles of the European Union, the United
Nations, and international law.
In short, it is now up to Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Milo
Djukanovic, Ibrahim Rugova, the Contact Group, the European Union and
the OSCE to act.
As far as the Serb nation is concerned, it does not exist without
Kosovo.
The Serbs have to defend Kosovo at all cost, because their state,
Christianity, language, culture and epics were born in Kosovo.
There is plenty of room in Kosovo for both the Serbs and the
Albanians, for the Muslims, the Turks, and others.
There is no room in Kosovo for either the terrorists, or the terrorist
and occupational guerrilla force willing to change borders in the
Balkans, to create an ethnically clean Kosovo today, and an ethnically
clean Greater Albania tomorrow, based on the destruction of Serbia,
Macedonia and Montenegro.
By defending itself and its Kosovo, Serbia defends the U.N. Charter
and the concept of multi-ethnic, and not ethnic societies in Europe
and the world.
The "blood-and-soil" project is a Nazi project.
In today's Serbia one-third of the inhabitants are not Serbs.
In an ethnic sense, Serbia is the United States of the Balkans.
Therefore I am convinced that if they were alive today, both George
Washington and Abraham Lincoln would be on Serbia's side.
(The author is president of the Serbian Renewal Movement )
