Topic:
KOSOVO TODAY
Authors:
Shkëlzen Maliqi
When speaking about the phenomenon of the parallel authorities in
Kosovo, it is usually thought that the Albanians are the one who "of
their own will" and "in violation of the law" established parallel
institutions. That however is not the case. Not a single of the
parallel Kosovo institutions (parliament, government, ministries,
departments, school system, university, sports leagues, cultural
institutions, media etc.) was established after 1990, when the dual
authority was set up, but rather they existed earlier, as the
inseparable institutions of Kosovo's citizens and inheritances from
the previous system.
From the point of view of legality, the state of Kosovo was the one
that, after the forced and simple suspension of Kosovo's autonomy, as
an act of unique "internal" annexation of one of the equal federal
units of the former Yugoslav federation, a system of dual "Serbian"
institutions was established in Kosovo, under the direct control of
the government and regime in Belgrade, and always against the will of
the majority of citizens of Kosovo. The suspension of the Kosovo
assembly and government on July 5, 1990, when the Serbian legislature
"temporarily took over its functions," as the official explanation
was worded, represented at the same time an act of suspending the
institutions of sovereign authorities in the former federation, since
from that time a real and far reaching blockade of the work of the
then Federal Parliament came into force, and with that the federal
presidency and cabinet.
Namely, according to the constitution of 1974, the federal parliament
was so set up that it could not make a single decision nor constitute
a single executive department with the permission of the assemblies of
all eight federal units, thus including the Kosovo assembly. The
suspension of the autonomy of Kosovo had the effect of a state punch.
The federal system of the so called Second yugoslavia fell apart on
that day, July 5, 1990, rather than on June 26, 1991, when Slovenia
and Croatia proclaimed independence and when the Serbs, supported by
the regime and opposition in Belgrade, first in Croatia and then in
Bosnia-Herzegovina started the war.
War and peace conferences created a new reality in the Balkans, and
the recognition of new states and frontiers. Only in Kosovo does the
state of affairs remain the same as the one created between 1990 and
1992. On the one side the majority of the Albanian population (some
90% of the population of Kosovo) has maintained, and then built up
certain instruments and institutions of local and sovereign authority,
while Serbia via its proxies and the mobilized Serb minority (which
accounts for no more than eight percent of the population of Kosovo)
established a command system of police and military control of Kosovo,
with many elements of national apartheid.
In Kosovo during 1990-1992 both sides unilaterally worked on the
strategic and fundamental changes of constitutional relations. Serbia
carried that out "more effectively" leaning on force and completely
ignoring the will of Kosovo's Albanians. Amendments to the Serbian
Constitution in 1990 and the proclamation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1992, were aimed at prejudicing and cementing the
position of Kosovo in Serbia, and bring the Albanians before a done
thing. In fact, Serbia has openly declared a policy of radical
ownership and ethnic Serbization of Kosovo. a whole range of measures
and laws covering public property, infrastructure, economic and other
resources in Kosovo through arbitrary annexed property acts
were"proscribed" unilaterally as the property of the Serbian state, or
were made gifts of to companies in Serbia.
An illegal campaign of dismissals was implemented during which in a
short period of time, some 150,000 Albanians were left without work.
The discriminatory laws (like the one banning the sale of real estate
to Albanians) and various measures of administrative fright, abuse,
police repression, staged trials and legalized state theft had as
their goal to create feelings of insecurity and fear among Albanians,
so that they would be forced into a mass exodus. The effect of this
repressive policy is seen in the fact that hundreds of thousands of
Albanians have sought political asylum in western countries.
It was only circumstance that saved Kosovo from catastrophe then.
Preparations and the waging of the war in Croatia and Bosnia, their
duration and outcome, created a fear of opening the so called southern
front, which led to a strategic withdrawal of "Yugoslav"/Serb army
from Macedonia and reigned in radical Serb aspirations to "resolve"
the Kosovo issue by war according to the scenario: create local or
general rebellion of the Albanians in Kosovo, then implement a firm
"scorch the earth" reprisal which would force millions of Albanians to
flee.
FYR Macedonia President Kiro Gligorov recalled this scenario in recent
days, making public the existence of a plan for refugee camps and
corridors for the express transfer of Kosovo refugees in the direction
of Albania. However, the Kosovo Albanians in a critical period led a
wise policy of not responding to provocations and peaceful resistance
and mainly declarative political activity. The Albanian part of the
Kosovo assembly on June 2, proclaimed a Declaration of Independence,
on Sep. 7, 1990, the Republic of Kosovo (Kacanica Constitution), at
the end of September 1991, a referendum was held on the independence
of Kosovo, while at the end of May, 1992, an independent parliament
and presidential elections for the Republic of Kosovo were organized.
On the Albanian side such changes were mostly symbolic and
aspirational in character, because the Republic of Kosovo could not be
established as a real authority with an army, police and other organs
of authority. The Republic of Kosovo represents more a type of
organized and independent society, rather than a state. The largest
independent system in that parallel organism are the schools (from
pre-school institutions to the university), and complete or partial
network of social, political, union, health-humanitarian, sports,
information and cultural associations and organizations. Most of those
associations and organizations existed pre 1990, and after the bans
and emergency measures or the so called receiverships, they simply
continued to work in new conditions and circumstances.
The entire Albanian school system, which had enjoyed complete
independence prior to 1991, continued to work after it was expelled
from its facilities. To maintain these systems, the Albanians built
(the only actually new) parallel system of taxation (three percent of
revenues). Part of this fund is collected in the West, part in Kosovo,
and it is from this revenue that more important organisms (such as
schools) are financed, as is the managing, political caste of the
Albanians. The Serb authorities tolerated this great self-organization
of Albanian society, but they cut at the roots attempts to build a
state or para-state formations (preventing the opening of the Kosovo
parliament in 1992, through arrests and trials the union of Albanian
police officers was broken, a group that tried to organize a Defense
ministry was jailed, and the formation of an independent chamber of
commerce of Kosovo was prevented).
The status quo in Kosovo was maintained in recent years mostly thanks
to the fact that the Albanians had succeeded in organizing an
independent society, while Serbia kept control of classic state
functions. State and society are in open conflict, but neither can
state vanquish the society, nor can the society defeat the state. The
problem lies in the fact that "society" on the one side, and the state
on the other side have become completely "ethnically clean" and the
relationship between them has become one of brute force; the "Serb"
state in Kosovo is maintained solely through weapons, while the
Albanian independent society has so far demonstrated flexibility and
political modalities of self-confirmation, while in recent times some
have lost patients, and formed groups called the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA), and have undertaken guerrilla operations against the Serb
police.
But the KLA does not seem to represent a significant factor that can
influence a major shift of power. Is there any hope that the Kosovo
Albanian "society" and Serb "state" could somehow reconcile? The
outlook is not great, because the Albanian society which feels
politically independent cannot have forced upon it a greater degree of
servitude and participation in political life in Serbia and
Yugoslavia, while on the other side, a return of any degree of
autonomy and state responsibilities to the Albanian society, the Serb
side experiences as an historic defeat and the start of the real loss
of Kosovo. Parallel authorities in Kosovo maintain themselves courtesy
of the fact that both sides are determined to have an either/or
resolution of the Kosovo issue (it should be either Albanian or Serb),
but luckily, both sides are aware that such exclusive solutions cannot
be forced and realized by force.
At this time neither the Serb nor the Albanian side fear a real
resolution (which by necessity must be a compromise) rather than
maintaining the status quo, which for both sides extends the illusion
of superiority, the Serb police and military supremacy, and the
Albanian supremacy in control of society... It would thus seem that
the current political elites, even if they publicly declare themselves
otherwise, are more prepared to accept a formal maintenance of
parallel worlds and flows, than to agree on a status that would bring
major changes to Yugoslavia/Serbia (because it would both politically
and economically have to recognize the full equality of the Albanians)
or in the Albanian society which with great distrust watches the
possibilities of participating in Serbia's political life, and to
which a high degree of autonomy or the status of a republic is only
the means rather than the end.
It is understood, there are only two ways to resolve the Kosovo issue:
one is the long and uncertain road of negotiations, the other is one
of the forms of military resolutions (long, simmering and exhausting
war; or a variation of the Blitz krieg with an uncertain outcome for
both sides...). Even though there are many rational resolutions on
option, it would be difficult to forecast which could take root...
That is left to the negotiating process, if it starts. At this moment
I believe the most rational and "least painful" is the implementation
of a formula without final resolution, based on power sharing, some
kind of extension of the current situation of dual authority and
parallel life, but under agreed conditions. If such a solution is
found (so far only on paper) for the albanian schools, the same
formula could spread to other institutions.
Thus one can recognize and legalize a dual system of authority, but
only by establishing third instances which would the interests and
prevent conflicts. For example, it would be possible to organize
something that could be called a Kosovo free region or zone, similar
to the free zone established in Trieste at one time, that is without
formal sovereignty (Yugoslavia could be guaranteed, for a determined
period of time, effective protection of economic, national and
cultural interests). This free zone or region would be monitored on a
tri-partite basis, by a joint Serb-Albanian commission and the
European Union as the guarantor, and which could later, when the
proper conditions are created, become a part of regional Europe.
(The author is a philosopher and publicist from Pristina)
(End)
Mihailo Markovic
The problems that today exist in Kosovo stem partly from very
realistic opposing interests of the Serbian and Albanian peoples,
partly from prejudices of ideological and cultural character. The
unavoidable real conflict of interests lies in the fact that the great
majority of the population of Kosovo (around 90 percent) is comprised
of Albanians, but, on the other hand, Kosovo has been the Serb cradle
and it is today a part of the Serb state.
The Albanians from Kosovo are attempting to realize their optimal
national goal - their national state on the entire ethnic space which
they have conquered in recent decades (thanks above all, to a greater
demographic growth than experienced by their neighbors). the Kosovo
Albanians are steadfastly implementing the plan of Prizren League of
1878. That project envisaged the formation of a Greater Albania, which
besides Albania would include Kosovo, eastern Montenegro, southern
Serbia and western Macedonia.
The difficulty with that plan lies in the fact that the disputed areas
have already been encompassed by other states and the fact that the
Albanian people have frequently counted on the wrong allies, those who
+lost wars (Turkey, Austria-Hungary, Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's
Italy). Temporarily the Albanians had seized control over the desired
areas, but with the defeat of the great allies their national
aspirations completely disintegrated.
The Serbs are doing what any other nation would do. They are holding
on to territory that has been their's for centuries, which has great
symbolic significance for their national identity, which is rich with
Serb cultural monuments and natural resources and, what is most
significant, it is an internationally recognized part of their state.
As we have seen, the English did not relinquish the Falkland Islands,
the Americans are not even considering ceding one of their southern
states to nations of Spanish origin (who now number more than 25
million) or blacks (who number over 30 million). In a similar fashion,
the Spanish, French, Italian and Romanians do not wish to discuss the
secession of Basque or Catalonia, Corsica, the south Tyrol and
Transylvania.
The binding rules of international relations at this moment are very
clear -- nations that have been part of a multi national state can
have the support of the international community for their secession
and the formation of their own sovereign state. Those ethnic
communities which are only a part of a nation which already has its
domicile state (such as the Kosovo Albanians have Albania) must remain
national minorities in the states where they find themselves. The
number of members the minority has, plays no role.
The fact is simply that the entire international order would be broken
if that rule was to be changed. There are no ethnically clean states
in the world and if internationally recognized states frontiers were
changed each time an ethnic community so desired, the only possible
consequence would be undescribable chaos and bloodshed. The conflict
would be difficult to solve even if it was based on one realistic
difference. It, however, is complicated by additional ideological,
religious and cultural facts.
The Kosovo Albanians do not find it enough that ethnic reasons are on
their side -- they do not recognize the Serb's historic rights. They
believe that Kosovo was their land, a long time before the Serbs
arrived in Kosovo in the 6th and 7th centuries. They proclaimed
themselves to be the descendants of the Illyrians, a people who lived
in the Balkans before the arrival of the Romans. There are no
scientific facts to back their belief that they are descendent of the
Illyrians and that they lived in the balkans before the arrival of the
Serbs.
Not only that, in Kosov there is abundant material evidence of the
exclusive presence of the Serbs. All place names are Serbian, all
churches, all monasteries and other cultural monuments are Serb.
Nowhere is there any trace of a past Albanian civilization. According
to Turk records from the 14th and 15th centuries there were almost no
Albanian inhabitants. Undoubtedly it migrated there after the Serb
uprising against the Turks in the 17th Century, when out of fear of
reprisals the Serbs left Kosovo in large numbers and migrated to the
territory of Croatia and Hungary (present day Krayina and Voyvodina).
All life in Kosovo today is undertaken in two parallel societies --
the Albanian and the Serb. each has its own authority, its economy,
education and culture. Economically the Albanians dominate without a
doubt -- the lion's share of the capital is in their hands. Of those
who sabotaged the workings of the joint social companies, many found
jobs n private companies owned by their compatriots.
Almost exclusively it is the Serbs who sit in the local government.
The Albanian boycott of the elections and state institutions suits
them just fine. It was the only possible way for the Serbs to not just
participate in local authority, but rather to hold the full monopoly
of power. It is to their advantage that the Albanians not accept
autonomy, the one they have a right to under the current Serbian
constitution.
In view of the violations of human rights, it would important to be
rid of the following mistification. It is likely that a certain degree
of repression does exist in Kosovo. The very fact that large numbers
of police and soldiers are deployed in Kosovo, and that relations
between the two peoples are burdened by the boycott, intolerance and
hatred, probably leads to a situation in which illegitimate acts of
repression are becoming more expressed.
However, the problem with human rights in Kosovo is far more the
consequence of the Albanians rejecting to use the human rights no one
is denying them. They are boycotting the elections even though they
would surely win in Kosovo. The entire local government would be in
their hands. In the Serbian legislature they could have as many as 30
seats and they would play the decisive role in making many decisions,
considering the balance of power between the regime and the
opposition.
Also, all the problems in education were created by their boycott of
schools and their non-recognition of the institutions of the state in
which they live. Pristina university was not "closed," as some foreign
media maliciously claim. It is open and it is attended by thousands of
students from all parts of Yugoslavia. The Albanian students are
rejecting to attend, they are demanding the university facilities all
to themselves.
All this is done keeping in mind the detrimental international
position of Yugoslavia and in the hope that it will lead to an
international intervention on their behalf. But since neither the U.S.
nor the international community recognize their right to secession and
the formation of a sovereign state of Kosovo, more radical forces are
appearing and attempting to internationalize the conflict through
terrorist actions.
This is a very dangerous road for both the Serbs and the albanians.
The only sensible and internationally acceptable approach would be to
establish dialog and find a solution by which both sides would
sacrifice something in the interest of peace and global cooperation
between the Albanian and Serb peoples, as well as between the states
of Albania and Yugoslavia.
The Albanians would have to renounce secession from Serbia and
Yugoslavia, while the Serbs would have to give up the privileges they
now enjoy in Kosovo thanks to the Albanian boycott.
The Serbs must guarantee and implement in practice all political and
social-economic rights of the Albanians, without any discrimination of
the citizens of Kosovo on the national or religious basis. Also, the
modality of territorial autonomy must be agreed upon, as described in
the Serbian Constitution of 1990.
On the other hand, the Albanians, like all other minorities in the
world, must accept Serbia and Yugoslavia as their state, as their
compatriots are doing in all the other states where they live as the
minority.
The alternative would be total war in which all the sides could only
loose.
(The author is a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts)
(End)
